Tag Archives: Atatürk

Turks don’t suffer from Sèvrophobia; they suffer from Lausannitis.

9 Oct

One of today’s Reuters’ titles: Turkey urges U.S. to review visa suspension as lira, stocks tumble is a very deeply unintentional funny.  Is he dyslexic?  Am I?  I’ve read it correctly, yes?  The UNITED STATES is suspending visas to TURKS? The TURKISH lira and TURKISH stocks are tumbling? Right?

There’s been a ton of repetitive commentary again recently — including from me — about how Kurdish, let’s say, “pro-activeness,” in Iraq and Syria, what Kurds think is their right since they played such a key role in kicking ISIS ass, is a menace to Turkey because Turks are still traumatized by the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres that called for the remaining Ottoman Empire (Anatolia essentially) to be partitioned between the winners of WWI (and the hangers-on and cheerleaders like us), with the Straits and Constantinople internationalized (meaning British), so that Turks would have been left with a rump central Turkey and, I think, a minimal outlet to the Black Sea along the coastal stretch around Sinope.

All of that was changed by Atatürk’s declaration of a Turkish Republic at Sebasteia and the subsequent disastrous defeat of the invading Greek army.  The Turkish War of Independence (please, Greeks, gimme a break and let me call it that for now) was an impressive accomplishment, and if it ended badly for the Greeks who lived there, as we remember every autumn when we recite the Megilla of Smyrna, that’s our fault and especially the fault of Venizelos who, being Cretan, found pallikaristiko demagoguery and dangerous, careerist magandalık irresistible So impressive was Kemal’s accomplishment, in fact, that all the parties involved in Sèvres then got together at Lausanne in 1923 and decided Turkey should get whatever it wants.  Suddenly, the clouds of three centuries of depressing imperial contraction, and massacre and expulsion of Muslims from the Caucasus, the northern Black Sea, the Balkans and Crete were lifted (ditch the Arabs south and call it a country seemed to be the Turkish consensus for whatever was left) and the Turkish Republic went on its merry way.  Sèvres and Sèvrophobia was gone.

What Turkey suffers from now, and has for most of the twentieth century since the events we’re talking about, is a Lausanne-inspired sense of entitlement that is simply breathtaking in its cluelessness.  It’s the kind that leaves you staring at some Turks, silenced and dumbfounded, and unable to tell whether what they just said to you is elegantly, sweepingly aristocratic or just passively asinine.  Lausanne was first; add Kemal’s personality cult (I’m not sure that history ever threw together two bigger narcissists than him and Venizelos; they should’ve been lovers), then, what was always a silenced Ottomanness came out of the closet, allied as it always has been with the seminal triumphalist narrative of Islam itselfand you get Erdoğan!

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Now he wants the U.S. to review its Turkey policies?  Who is this man?  Scolding the whole fucking world like we’re a bunch of children.  Let him scold his children — meaning Turks — first, and then maybe we can take it from there.  If I were a German diplomat in Turkey and had been summoned to His Sublime Presence for the nth time in one year to be chastised for something mocking someone in Germany had said about Him, and told “to do” something about it, I would have found it hard to control my laughter.  As an outsider, I find it delightful enough that of all peoples on the planet, Turks and Germans got involved in a multi-episode drama on the nature of irony and parody. But to have him demand shit from all sides…

No, you’re not a “mouse that roared” arkadaşım, ok?  Yes, “all of Luxembourg is like one town in Turkey” (wow…ne büyük bir onur).  Turkey’s a big, scary, powerful country with a big, scary, powerful military, and lots of “soft” cultural and economic power in its region too.  But you’re in a schoolyard with some much bigger cats.  Soon all of them — the United States, Russia, the European Union, Israel and even some who already openly can’t stand your guts — like Iran — are gonna come to the conclusion that you’re more trouble than you’re worth.  Even Germany is no longer so guilt-ridden as to be polite to you.  And I don’t say any of this as a Greek, because I don’t think that when they all get to that exasperated point and temporarily turn to Greece, that Greeks are going to be anything other than the chick you were drunk enough to take home for a one-nighter — Kurds are going to be the rebound girlfriend, though I can’t say right now for how long — but things have been moving rapidly in a direction where the big boys are not going to want to play with you anymore, and they’re going to let you know in a way that won’t be pretty.

Though, as with all bullies, as soon as Erdoğan’s tough-guy bluff-policy on anything is called, he backs down.

Comment: nikobakos@gmail.com

“Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination” by Stefan Ihrig

30 Mar

Adolf Hitler in the workshop of the sculptor Josef Thorak, with Thorak’s bust of Atatürk behind him, Munich, February 1937Adolf Hitler in the workshop of the sculptor Josef Thorak, with Thorak’s bust of Atatürk behind him, Munich, February 1937 (click)

From The New York Review of Book.  See whole article: Hitler & the Muslims by Steve Coll in April 2, 2015 volume.

Money quote (at least for our purposes):

“The aim of Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination is to document that the founder of modern Turkey deserves to be remembered as a figure equal to Mussolini in Hitler’s early political imagination. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, later glorified as Atatürk, had a record of military action that included cleansing what Hitler believed to be the inherently sapping multiethnicity of the expired Ottoman Empire.

“Indeed, in Ihrig’s account, apart from Atatürk’s personal inspiration, the organized mass killing of Armenians by Turks during World War I—the events now recognized as the Armenian Genocide—explicitly influenced Hitler’s thinking about the extermination of Jews as early as the 1920s. Ihrig quotes a multipart essay published in Heimatland, an influential Nazi periodical, by Hans Tröbst, who had fought with the Kemalists during what Turks knew as the War of Independence:

‘The bloodsuckers and parasites on the Turkish national body were Greeks and Armenians. They had to be eradicated and rendered harmless; otherwise the whole struggle for freedom would have been put in jeopardy. Gentle measures—that history has always shown—will not do in such cases…. Almost all of those of foreign background in the area of combat had to die; their number is not put too low with 500,000. [emphasis in original]’

“In incipient Nazi historiography, Ihrig writes, “the ‘fact’ that the New Turkey was a real and pure völkisch state, because no more Greeks or Armenians were left in Anatolia, was stressed time and again, in hundreds of articles, texts, and speeches.” Of course, the Nazi Holocaust was constructed in its own setting, from its own sources; one should not overemphasize the Armenian precedent, and Ihrig does not. Yet here is a documented example from the early industrialization of ethnic murder in which one campaign of genocide influenced another.

And a key point:

“Politically, Atatürk’s success offered a model of how to overcome the humiliation and prostration imposed on World War I’s losers at Versailles. Atatürk not only seized power through bold action in the name of the Turkish nation, he also forced European capitals to renegotiate the terms of the treaty they had imposed…”

Comment: nikobakos@gmail.com

Careful what you wish for…Erdoğan and Ottoman Turkish

5 Jan

Screen Shot 2015-01-03 at 4.21.54 PM(click)

I always thought that the switch to Latin script was one of Atatürk’s most needless changes, and one that was most pettily symbolic and purposeless.  Yeah, no vowels are a pain, but only for non-native learners, and I also despise nationalist manipulation and deep reform of language in any situation: the Sanskritization of Urdu, for example, in India.  Closer to home, the “purification” of Greek in the nineteenth century and its reverse “demoticization” starting in the 1970s, has made it so that at this point we have no idea what a Greek that was an organic development of Byzantine and Ottoman Greek would have been like and how much richer a medium for our modern literature and speech it could have been before the ideologues got involved.

I was vehemently opposed to the dropping of classical Greek from the curriculum in Greek schools in the heady stupidity of the “Metapoliteuse.”*  You were cutting off Greek kids from the bulk of their literary tradition.  But those were two thousand-year-old texts.  The change in script and the de-Persianization and de-Arabization of modern Turkish** were so radical that by the nineteen-forties, I believe, a young Turk couldn’t read the Turkish of his own nineteenth-century literature.  I don’t think reintroducing the study of Ottoman Turkish is a bad idea and had always said so.  Of course, now — given where it’s coming from — there are Turkish friends who detest me for it.

But “Cometh the hour, cometh the man,” I guess.  And ιδού (“bak”) the hero who comes to fix it all…  ERDOĞAN, malaka…  Trying to introduce Ottoman Turkish into the curriculum, but not so young Turks can read the political and ideological thoughts of their nineteenth-century ancestors and their heroic struggle to try and turn what was left of empire into a modern state, much less for the beautiful mystic and erotic poetry that the Ottoman canon consists of…  But probably so that they’re ready to read the Quran and other Arabic texts when the time comes.

I actually have to admit I was caught off guard by this one.  I mean, I knew as far back as the nineteen-eighties that “Ottomanostalgia” could go both ways.  It could turn into a means for young Turks to understand not just their own heritage, but most crucially for the region, a way of understanding their intimate, organic connection to their neighbors in the former Ottoman sphere, and take them out of that strange identity vacuum that the ethnicity-based nation-state creates: where the perception obtains that where your borders end, an entirely new universe inhabited by completely different species begins, and not — as is the historical truth — that the border is an arbitrary marker between a continuum of cultural landscapes and people/s who lived, again, organically intertwined with each other for most of their history.  And to a great degree, as an interest in the Ottoman past has spread out from a nucleus of C-town intellectuals to a broader and more broad-minded, educated middle class, that is what has happened — and to a degree that is simply incomparable to any such growth processes of consciousness in any other contemporary Ottoman successor society.

Or…  It could’ve turned into a new longing for a newly empowered Turkey for expansionist, regional influence and general bullying under a new guise.

What I didn’t expect is that it would come in the form of religious reaction.

Like I said: watch what you wish for.

Comment: nikobakos@gmail.com

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* The Μεταπολίτευση: the “repoliticizing” or “re-polis-izing” (in the classical Greek sense of “polis”) — the reanimating, or re-establishing, essentially — of Greek political life in 1974 after the damage done by one of the most tragicomically ridiculous right-wing dictatorships in post-war Europe or Latin America.  It was a time of reaction to things “right” that produced some of the most embarrassingly “lefty” cultural phenomena and attitudes — phenomena and attitudes that have proven remarkably long-lived — among Greeks, and I don’t see a near future in which we’ll recover from those attitudes or be able to strike a mature balance between the poles.  I’ll have to tackle the term a little better in another post of its own.

** I think the Farsi influence on Ottoman Turkish consisted more of analytic, Indo-European structures that had crept into the language and that the “polluting” vocabulary was mostly Arabic.  I remember when I was studying Turkish, I think, wanting to start a relative clause with the relative pronoun “ki” or wanting to make it easy on myself by starting a subordinate clause with the Farsi “çünkü” (“because”) — which everyone does — and being told by my teachers that “That’s not Turkish” and being made to construct some fifteen-syllable “-için” or “-ından” clause instead, which was more “purely” agglutinatively Turkish.  Of course, like all dystopian, totalitarian, social re-engineering projects, this purification of Turkish never got nearly as far as its original orthodox intent, partly because to have done so would’ve been the equivalent of expunging Modern English of every word of Greco-Latin-Norman-French origin in this paragraph, for example highlighted in red — and creating Anglo-Saxon-derived neologisms for all of them.

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