Balkans, Anatolia, Caucasus, Levant and other Middle East, Iran, Afghanistan, South Asia, occasional forays into southern Italy, Spain or eastern Europe, minorities, the nation-state and nationalism — and whatever other quirks or obsessions lurk inside my head.
This is not just a Turkish issue. The Greek Regime implements an Assimilation policy against Macedonians, Vlahs (Aromanians), Albanians, Turks, Pomaks, Roma.Also The Greek Church is one of the main actors of assimilation pic.twitter.com/a7ReFtU1L8
Correction: The Greek Church was on of the main actors of assimilation. Pretty irrelevant on those grounds today. Nor do I see Vlachs or Albanians or even Macedonians leaving their respective Orthodox Churches at any point in the future.
But before we start feeling all outraged and superior, the fate of Ottoman mosques in the Balkans has not been much better. How the few — like Jiannena’s — that survived did so is a miracle. And even in Jiannena we have two perfectly preserved mosques, thankfully, and one in a bad state, and a fourth that is not even recognizable unless you know it’s there; this out of a total of 18 mosques before the 1920s.
Plus while we’re on phalluses and hard-ons, it’s become the thing for both Serbian Orthodox and Croatian Catholic churches in Bosnia to build ridiculously high bell-towers, under the unspoken order that they be conspicuously higher than any neighboring minarets.
(And enjoy Altaras himself, a cute, smart Jewish boy fluent in Ladino, which, from what I gather, is not such a common skill anymore among Turkey’s young Jews. Embarrassed-smile emoji…)
Next time a Turk or Turkey/Islam apologist tells you that progressive, tolerant, cosmopolitan Turkey gave refuge to Jewish intellectuals and scientists persecuted by the Nazis during the 1930s, remind them that a few years later the Turkish Republic imposed an over 100% estate tax — the Varlık Vergisi, also imposed on Greeks and Armenians — on its own Jews, which ruined most and saw many sent to lethal work camps in Anatolia as punishment, where many died.
One voice of protest:
Context: from the massacres of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Lausanne Population Exchange, the various rulings and legal restrictions placed on non-Turkish speakers and non-Muslims following the founding of the Republic, the 1934 Thrace Pogrom against Jews, the estate tax (above), the anti-Greek Pogrom of 1955, the Deportations of Greeks in 1964-65 and the general climate of fear and violence and harassment non-Muslims still live under in contemporary Turkey — the Varlık Vergisi represents just one episode in a process of a massive transfer of capital from non-Muslim to Muslim hands in the 20th century – a transfer which laid the groundwork for late 20th and early 21st century Turkey’s booming (or now not-so-booming) economy.
Makes one think of Hafez. Yes, I know this particular poem is quoted to death, but it’s one of the first that really grabbed me when I first discovered Persian poetry:
1.
اگر آن ترک شیرازی به دست آرد دل ما را به خال هندویش بخشم سمرقند و بخارا را
‘agar ‘ān Tork-e Šīrāzī * be dast ārad del-ē mā-rābe xāl-ē Hendu-yaš baxšam Samarqand ō Boxārā-rā
If that Shirazi Turk accepts my heart in their hand, for their Indian mole I will give Samarkand and Bukhara.
2.
بده ساقی می باقی که در جنت نخواهی یافت کنار آب رکن آباد و گلگشت مصلا را
bedeh, sāqī, mey-ē bāqī ke dar jannat naxāhī yāftkenār-ē āb-e Roknābād o golgašt-ē Mosallā-rā
Wine-pourer, give the rest of wine, since in heaven you will not find the banks of the water of Roknabad and the rose-walk of Mosalla.
3.
فغان کاین لولیان شوخ شیرین کار شهرآشوب چنان بردند صبر از دل که ترکان خوان یغما را
faqān k-īn lūliyān-ē šūx -e šīrīnkār-e šahrāšūbčonān bordānd sabr az del ke Torkān xān-e yaqmā-rā
Alas for these mischievous gypsies who do sweet things and make the town riot! they have stolen the patience from my heart like Turks at a banquet of plunder.
4.
ز عشق ناتمام ما جمال یار مستغنی است به آب و رنگ و خال و خط چه حاجت روی زیبا را
ze ‘ešq-ē nātamām-ē mā jamāl-ē yār mostaqnī-stbe āb ō rang o xāl ō xat če hājat rūy-e zībā-rā?
Of our imperfect love the glory of the beloved is independent; what need does a beautiful face have for powder and colour and mole and line?
5.
من از آن حسن روزافزون که یوسف داشت دانستم که عشق از پرده عصمت برون آرد زلیخا را
man az ‘ān hosn-e rūz-afzūn ke Yūsof dāšt dānestamke ‘ešq az parde-yē ‘esmat borūn ārad Zoleyxā-rā
I have learnt, from that daily-increasing beauty that Joseph had, that Love will bring Zoleykha out from behind the curtain of modesty.
6.
اگر دشنام فرمایی و گر نفرین دعا گویم جواب تلخ میزیبد لب لعل شکرخا را
Listen to advice, my soul, since even more valuable than their soul youths who seek happiness hold the advice of a knowledgeable elder.
8.
حدیث از مطرب و می گو و راز دهر کمتر جو که کس نگشود و نگشاید به حکمت این معما را
hadīs az motreb-ō mey gū * vo rāz-ē dahr kamtar jūke kas nagšūd o nagšāyad * be hekmat ‘īn mo’ammā-rā
Tell a tale of minstrel and wine, and seek the secret of time less, since no one has ever solved or will ever solve this riddle with wisdom.
9.
غزل گفتی و در سفتی بیا و خوش بخوان حافظ که بر نظم تو افشاند فلک عقد ثریا را
qazal goftī o dor softī * biyā vō xoš bexān, Hāfezke bar nazm-ē to afšānad * falak ‘egd-ē Sorayyā-rā
You have completed your poem and pierced the pearl; come and sing beautifully, Hafez, that on your compositions Heaven may scatter the necklace of the Pleiades.
I once got into an argument with a Turkish art historian friend of mine after I referred to the eight round canvasses with the first caliphs’ names on them (I think) in Hagia Sophia as “the hideous green billboards”. She, of course, thought they were “cool” or “pastiche-y” or “palimpsest-y”. I thought, and think, that they not only mar the space by covering the joints between the massive square space and the massive dome which are perhaps the most ingenious aspect of this miracle of Roman engineering, but that they were meant to send a clear message of who was now in charge. Hers is a typical “woke” take on these things. In the article below, Axel Çorlu highlights the dangers of such gleefully amoral, post-modern celebrations of funky “conjunctures” and how they essentially elide the historical facts of violence, persecution and appropriation from our picture of the past, and how — in the particular case of Hagia Sophia — these academics end up feeding the discourse of both Ottoman/Muslim triumphalism and the oppression and displacement of religious minorities by the nationalism of the Turkish Republic.
In short, you may want to get past “conquest narratives”; Erdoğan — who justified the reconversion by the “right of conquest” — doesn’t.
My money quotes:
They [Patricia Blessing and Ali Yaycıoğlu, titled “Beyond Conquest Narratives: Hagia Sophia, Past and Present”] conclude this section with the heart of their essay: “…in this essay, we would like to divert the conversation and discuss how the conquest narrative, which is shared by those who oppose and support the decision, does not do justice to Hagia Sophia and its architecturally, spiritually, and emotionally charged history.” This sort of interjection, very appealing to the academic mind, nonetheless includes ominous terminology such as “doing justice” to the Hagia Sophia and its “…emotionally charged history.”
This narrative at once establishes the issue of “justice,” not in the sense of the expropriation and destruction of Christian and/or minority populations and the appropriation of their cultural heritage, but as in, “Let us not be unfair to the Ottomans or the Turkish Republic…” and the fact that those who respond to the Hagia Sophia issue might be affected by the same “emotionally charged” aspects. In other words, the authors are guiding us to focus on “justice,” as long as it is to protect the powerful who do not need any protection –there appears to be no need to consider the concept of justice for the dispossessed, whom the Hagia Sophia also symbolizes. […]
While the republican regime was indeed interested in recasting the Ottoman past (usually not in a very bright light, as it also distanced itself from many of its aspects and dictated a highly selective version of its history) and kept busy trying to prove that “Turks” had existed in Anatolia for millennia through the Hittites and other ancient peoples with an eclectic mix of the racial theories and pseudo-science of the time (including the infamous obsession with the morphology and measurements of skulls), it hardly made an effort to understand, teach, or preserve its Byzantine past, let alone “making a claim” to it, if what we mean by “making a claim” is anything more than a possessive but not inclusive approach.
Indeed, the Byzantine past of Turkey remained either buried, neglected, or carefully molded in the public imagination, as nothing more than the “other” that had happened to be there before.At no point did the republic genuinely try to make a direct connection to the Byzantines beyond their role as the adversary in history textbooks, the adversary that had been vanquished, the adversary that had nothing to do with the ethnicity or cultural heritage of the people in Turkey. […]
Beyond its [the conversion of Hagia Sophia into a museum] practical use as described, it was neither part of a grand historical or intellectual vision, nor a noble gesture of “tolerance” by a regime that did its very best to eliminate the remaining diversity of cultures and religions in its lands for decades to come through acts ranging from the population exchange with Greece, to the Izmir Economics Congress of 1923 where the elimination of “foreign” bourgeoisie and its replacement with a “national” one was planned, to the Varlik Vergisi (Capital Tax) of 1942, among many other examples. Such a regime surely could not care less about multiculturalism, inclusivity, or the Byzantine past as the authors suggest. […]
This idea also worked very well for the urban Kemalist elite and their newly created middle class throughout the 20th century, because it did not require them to symbolically come to terms with the vast destruction visited upon the minorities of the land, from whom they had acquired significant aspects of their material and cultural wealth via direct or indirect appropriation…
I agree that a narrative that “equates Ottoman approaches to Hagia Sophia with iconophobia and iconoclasm is incorrect” but I do not think it is necessarily “marked by Islamophobia and Orientalism” given the fact that Byzantine art and architecture suffered tremendous degradation and damage, sometimes in the name of Islam, and other times at the hands of unscrupulous republican bureaucrats, treasure hunters, or the common public in more recent times. Any scholar, casual observer, or visitor of Byzantine, Armenian, or Syriac heritage sites in Turkey will be more than cognizant of the intentional damage done to frescoes, mosaics, and other elements of Christian architecture. The damage was done over a period of centuries under different conditions, the perpetrators were/are not a homogeneous group, and the practice ranges from officially undertaken projects to “simply” neglected sites. This is an undeniable fact, and it would be disingenuous to suggest that the few token examples in the Ottoman era, republican era or today somehow represent a “preservationist” or “tolerant” attitude when in the vast majority of locations they were covered at best and destroyed at worst. …..Today, the Turkish state uses sites such as the restored Aghtamar Cathedral of the Holy Cross or the Sumela Monastery as tokens of its hollow “multiculturalism” and “tolerance.” As scholars, we have a grave responsibility to challenge this narrative. This multiculturalism narrative and tokenism of Turkey is a propaganda tool designed to cover the simultaneous appropriation and destruction of the past and the present, motivated to a significant extent by the conquest narrative. The conquest narrative was a real factor in history, and it is a real factor today. Ignoring it, reducing it to merely an “incorrect” historical interpretation, or diminishing it to an ahistorical approach is dangerous. […]
The reconversion of the Hagia Sophia is about power; in a world where power relations past and present influence the lives of millions of people, and history is weaponized for various agendas, we do not have the luxury of pretending to “stay above it” in a noncommittal manner.
The interior of Hagia Sophia with the eight “hideous green billboards”. Getty Images.
Dangers of Convenient Universalism: Power Relations and Responsibility of Scholars on the Hagia Sophia
2020-08-08
By Axel B. Çorlu, Ph.D.
The recent reconversion of the Hagia Sophia into a mosque by the (Turkish President Recep Tayyip) Erdogan regime generated heated debates among scholars, politicians, and the public. A recent article by Patricia Blessing and Ali Yaycioglu, titled “Beyond Conquest Narratives: Hagia Sophia, Past and Present” offers sophisticated but ultimately convenient universalism, where both the past and the present are presented from a distorted lens, with strategic omissions.[1]
According to Blessing and Yaycioglu, there is a binary “conquest narrative” that both the supporters and opponents of the Hagia Sophia reconversion utilize, and that in essence this simplistic view does not reflect the “complex history of Ottoman Hagia Sophia.” The authors go on to label the concerns about the protection of the structure, especially regarding the issue of the mosaics as ahistorical “disinformation,” and offer a “correct” version of history.
I will follow their text in the same order, and point out the multiple issues… (see below)
“German supermarket chain EDEKA has released a new commercial. The film focuses on the warm surprise of a German, who does not like his Turkish neighbors, on a Christmas eve spent alone with COVID-19.“
A wonderful, loving, attractive Turkish family has fun making goose and dumplings for their pissy old man German neighbor. The last line of the song is: “Dünyada en güzel şey, dost edinmek” — “The most beautiful thing in the world is having friends.” I’m a sucker for this kind of stuff.
Don’t know what “☪︎ Everything Turkish” is though, in the upper left. Maybe an AKP or Gülen front?
Balkans, Anatolia, Caucasus, Levant and rest of ME, Iran, South Asia
Me, I'm Nicholas Bakos, a.k.a. "NikoBako." I'm Greek (Roman really, but when I say that in English some five people in the world today understand what I'm talking about, so I use "Greek" for shorthand). I'm from New York. I live all over the place these days. The rest should become obvious from the blog.